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1.  Introduction
The recent, striking changes in the magnitude and direction of international capital
flows have been accompanied by equally remarkable changes in the composition of those
flows. The importance of those compositional changes ultimately depends on how
different the component flows are from one another.  This paper examines the behavior of
the major components and evaluates the extent of their differences.
The international balance of payments statistics divide international capital flows
into four main categories:  short-term investment, long-term investment, portfolio
investment, and direct investment. Some of these categories are said to be more volatile
than others.  For example, international short-term investment (STI) often is called "hot
money."  Extensive reliance on such "hot money" occasionally prompts fears of sudden
and destabilizing reversals of capital flows, particularly in developing countries. 2 In
contrast, foreign direct investment (DI) often is presumed to represent a more stable flow
of capital, one that somehow is linked more closely to the permanence of physical capital.
Yet, in principle, the various categories of capital flows merely represent alternative forms
of financing of the same underlying economic activity. That the major categories of
capital flows represent substitutable forms of financing suggests that they might not
behave so differently  from one another after all.
'The authors  would  like to thank Stijn  Claessens,  Eduardo  Fernandez-Arias,  Leonardo  Hernandez,  and
Nlandu  Mamingi for helpful  discussions.  This paper was prepared  for the International  Economics
Department  (IEC)  of the World  Bank.
2For  recent discussions  of the prospects  for a sudden  reversal  of capital  flows, see: Fernandez-Arias  and
Montiel  (1995),  and Hernandez  and Rudolph  (1995).
- 1 -With complete  capital  markets,  the differences  would  be of little  importance  since
the various  forms of financing  could be exchanged  easily  for one another. However,  it is
unclear  whether  or not capital  markets  are presently  liquid  enough  for substitution  across
these assets,  which  represent  very dissimilar  sets of claims. On one hand,  capital  markets
are by and large  now better developed  than they  have  ever  been. Many  assets have
become  tradeable  in a broad range of markets. As a result, distinctions  based  on the terms
of the instruments  comprising  each  category  of capital  flow may  have  become  less
meaningful. On the other hand,  imperfections  exist  in even  the most well-developed
financial  markets,  let alone  the rudimentary  financial  markets  of many  developing
countries. 3 Heterogeneous  information,  institutional  constraints,  and distortions  all
impede  substitution  across  the categories  of flows. 4 Consequently,  the various  flows  may
differ  in their effects  on the ultimate  costs and risks  associated  with external  finance. 5"6
Until  now, economists  have  provided  little empirical  support  for the common
perception  that the composition  of international  capital  flows  does matter. On the
contrary,  the limited  empirical  evidence  extant seems  to support  the view  that the flows
are essentially  the same. Specifically,  Claessens,  Dooley  and Warner  (CDW, 1993)  find
numerous  similarities  in the univariate  behavior  of the various  types of capital  flows. In
this paper, we also note some  univariate  similarities.  However,  we find  important
3Perfect  substitutability  is rejected  routinely  even  for assets  that differ  in only  a single  dimension,  such  as
the  currency  of  denomination  or maturity.  For  example,  uncovered  interest  parity  and the  term  structure
hypothesis  typically  are  rejected  even  within  the  Euromarket.
4Calvo  (1995)  discusses  many  of these  imperfections  in the  context  of  capital  market  crises.  Fernandez-
Arias  and Montiel  (1995)  catalogue  the  many  distortions  affecting  financial  markets.
5For  example,  in countries  with  a "debt  overhang,"  the  difficulty  of constraining  new  funds  to be used  for
investment  rather  than  consumption  may  inhibit  their  provision.  DI may  provide  a measure  of  control
over  the  use  of funds  for  investment.  If so,  then  DI differs  substantively  from  other  forms  of  flows.
61hese  differences  also  are  linked  to the role  of  the  adding  up constraint  of  the  balance  of  payments. As
long  as the  capital  flow  category  itself  does  not  influence  domestic  saving  or investment,  a change  in one
flow  must  be accompanied  by an offsetting  change  in the  remaining  flows.  However,  if the  form  of  the
flow  can  affect  investment,  the  adding  up constraint  no longer  implies  such  substitution  among  flows.
-2-differences  when  we study  the interactions  among  the various  flows. By studying  the
interactions  among  flows,  we are able  to examine  whether  the behavior  of one flow, such
as DI, seems  to govern  the behavior  of another,  such as STI. If one flow responds  to
another,  the two might appear  superficially  similar,  even  when they  are fundamentally
different. Indeed,  we find that this is the case  for our sample  of industrialized  and
developing  countries. We first confirm  the earlier  results  that the types of flows  we
investigate  appear  to behave  somewhat  similarly  when investigated  individually.  Yet, we
do not affirm  the interpretation  that the flows are essentially  the same. Instead,  we find
that STI appears  to be sensitive  to changes  in all the other types  of capital  flows, including
DI, but that DI does not. This suggests  that, despite  the univariate  similarities  of the two
flows,  DI might  play  a more  prominent  role in the determination  of subsequent  capital
flows.
We also examine  the links across  countries  for each type  of flow. Again,  we find
evidence  that STI  is more responsive  to changes  than  is DI. Disturbances  in STI appear  to
be transmitted  across  countries  much  more so than do disturbances  in DI.  A particularly
telling  example  is found  in the response  to sudden  changes  in capital  flows  to Mexico. A
disturbance  in Mexican  STI is followed  closely  by similar  changes  in the STI of the other
Latin American  countries  that we study (Argentina  and  Brazil). However,  there is no
significant  response  in the DI of those countries  to a similar  change  in Mexican  DI. This
implies  that only STI suffers  much  from the so-called  "Tequila  Hangover."
These  results strongly  suggest  that the composition  of capital  flows  does matter.
The similarities  among  the univariate  properties  of the flows  mask  some  important
underlying  differences.  The evidence  that STI responds  more dramatically  to disturbances
in other capital  flows and  in other countries  than  does DI, provides  support for the
conventional  wisdom  that STI  is "hot money"  and  DI is not. DI indeed  may  be a more
reliable  source  of external  financing  than  the other types  of capital  flows.
-3-The next section of the paper discusses several aspects of the data we examine,
including the level of disaggregation of the flows.  The subsequent sections of the paper
describe some of the similarities and differences we observe among the capital flow
categories.  Section 3 focuses on the relationships between flows within a country, while
Section 4 examines the links across countries.  Section 5 provides some concluding
remarks.
2.  Categories of Capital Flows
Capital flows can be categorized in various ways. In this paper, we focus most
closely on the categories of DI and STI, but we also examine two other broad categories
of foreign capital flows: portfolio investment (PI) and other long-term investment (LTI).7
All data come from the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments Statistics
Yearbook, and Appendix A contains detailed descriptions of the construction of each
category.  The DI category is intended to include those capital transactions in which a
foreign enterprise and a local one have a direct relationship; and it includes some equity
investment, reinvested earnings, and intracompany debt. PI represents other corporate
equities and bonds.  LTI includes other public and private sector debt securities, trade
credits, loans, deposits, and other assets with maturities of one year or more.  Changes in
investment in assets with maturities of under one year are captured under STI.O
?While  the  focus  here  is on categories  that  are  defined  by  their  intended  function  and  by  the instrument
that is traded,  others  have  segregated  capital  flows  on  the  basis  of  the  type  of  transactor  involved.  We
refrain  from  that  additional  disaggregation  in order  to emphasize  the  hot/cold  distinctions  discussed  in the
introduction  and  because  transactor  reporting  is said  to be less  reliable.
8AIthough  the  latest  IMF  Balance  of  Payments  Manual  has  broadened  the  coverage  of portfolio  debt
securities  to include  both  long-term  and short-term  securities,  this  modification  has  not  been  reflected  in
the  individual  countries'  balance  of  payments  data,  so  we retain  the  classification  of portfolio  debt
securities  by maturity.
-4-We examine quarterly net flows of these categories in fifteen countries for which
such data have been consistently reported.  The countries include: the Group of Seven
(G-7) industrialized countries -- Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States;  two emerging market countries in Europe -- Greece and
Portugal;  three developing Asian countries -- Indonesia, Korea, and Pakistan; and three
developing Latin American countries -- Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The sample period
we examine extends from 1985 to 1994. While a longer series of recorded flows is
available for many of these countries, we restrict our attention to the recent period
because of how the widespread financial  liberalization of the mid-eighties has changed the
behavior of the flows. In earlier periods, the categories sometimes differed markedly from
one another solely because of extremely rigid controls.  Were we to include that earlier
period, we would swamp their recent behavior with the pronounced distinctions that were
relevant solely before financial  liberalization. Thus, we would reject out of hand the
possibility that the various capital flows are now actually the same.
As is well known, integration of the financial markets of the G-7 accelerated in the
mid-eighties. Withholding taxes on interest payments to nonresidents were abolished in
the United States in 1984, making foreign holdings of U.S. bonds suddenly more
attractive.  Soon after, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom also abolished
withholding taxes and otherwise liberalized their markets. 9 In keeping with its new
membership in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, Portugal also adopted open
capital markets.  In Japan, an important financial liberalization package, introduced in
1984, brought about the development of new domestic and offshore money markets in
subsequent years. 10 Financial liberalization was less synchronized and often less sweeping
91n  1985  and  1986,  Germany  removed  restrictions  on the  form  of foreign  borrowing  in German  markets;
France  lifted  its restriction  that  French  residents  only  purchase  foreign  assets  from  other  French  residents;
and  the  United  Kingdom  liberalized  its security  markets  with  it's "Big  Bang."
l°New  short-term  markets  included  the  uncollateralized  call  money  market  in 1985,  the treasury  bill
market  in 1986,  and the  commercial  paper  market  and  the  Tokyo  offshore  money  market  in 1987.  Over
the  same  period,  foreign  companies  were  allowed  to begin  Japanese  banking  and  securities  operations.
-5 -in the other countries. Although  much  financial  liberalization  also occurred  in the mid-
eighties,  it came  somewhat  later to many  Latin  American  countries  and somewhat  less
uniformly  to Asian countries." 1 We choose 1985  as a starting  point  in order for the sample
period  to be reasonably  representative  of the modem post-liberalization  age for most of
the countries  we study.
For the G7 countries,  recent  capital  outflows  in the form of DI have  been quite
large,  making  up the bulk of their capital  outflows. The non-G7  countries  included  in our
sample  have  been  net recipients  of international  capital  flows; and,  throughout  the sample
period,  DI has made  up a substantial  portion  of their net inflows.  The composition  of
flows during  this period contrasts  sharply  with the composition  observed  before  the last
debt crisis. At that time, most of the international  flows  to the non-G7  countries  took the
form of debt; and equity  flows,  whether  through  DI or otherwise,  were relatively
unimportant."
3.  Intra-Country Evidence: Some Similarities and Differences  among Capital
Flows
In this section,  we first examine  individually  the capital  flows of the four
categories. Some  similarities  in the univariate  characteristics  of the four flows  seem  to
emerge. We then examine  whether  the apparent  similarities  among  the flows  persist  in a
more  general  specification  that allows  the different  categories  of flows  to influence  one
Shingehara  (1990)  provides  a succinct  summary  of  these  and  other  Japanese  financial  market
liberalizations  occurring  in the  eighties.
"  1For  example,  Mexico  liberalized  many  markets  in its 1987  pacto. As  Thorbecke  (I992)  describes,
Indonesia  substantially  liberalized  its treatment  of  both  domestic  and  foreign  capital  in 1983,  but trade
restrictions  were  not eased  until  later  in the  decade.  Korea  introduced  some  liberalization  measures  in
1982  and 1984;  and  a few  years  later,  interest  rate  decontrol  was  accelerated,  and  a new  schedule  for
liberalization  was  inaugurated  (though  some  restrictions  on  ownership  remain).  Frankel  (1991)  provides  a
detailed  discussion  of  the  Korean  liberalization.
1 2Fernandez-Arias  and  Montiel  (1995)  describe  the changes  in asset  composition  in more  detail.
-6 -another. We find  that they  do not: the similarities  apparent  in the univariate  context break
down in the more general  framework.
We begin  the univariate  analysis  by examining  the stationarity  of the capital  flow
series. We are interested  in the stationarity  of the series  both because  stationarity  could
have  its own substantive  implications  regarding  the controversy  at hand and because  it has
technical  implications  for the remaining  work in this study. A finding  that the series  differ
in terms of their stationarity  might  provide  some  initial  support  for the conventional  notion
that STI and DI are different. Alternatively,  a finding  that they are similar  in terms of their
stationarity  would  better support  the notion  of their substitutability.  We also examine
their stationarity  because  it could  have implications  for the proper treatment  of the series
in the remaining  work.
Table 1 and Table  2 summarize  the stationarity  tests. The tables  provide
augmented  Dicky-Fuller  unit root test statistics,  where  the lag length  for the tests of each
series  is chosen  through  sequential  testing  beginning  with eight lags. Table 1 gives  the
statistics  for the G-7 countries. As shown  in the table,  the statistics  are large  enough that
we are able  to reject  nonstationarity  in all but seven  cases. Of these non-rejections,  two
are found in each  of LTI, PI, and DI, while  one is found in STI. These results  by
themselves  are not suggestive  of important  differences  in the persistence  of the flows  in
the various  categories. Table  2 presents  the results  for the non-G7  countries,  for which
we examine  only STI and DI. For many  of these countries,  the other  two categories  (LTI
and PI) are affected  intermittently  by debt negotiations  and restructuring. Sometimes  the
effects  are substantial.  Rather  than attempting  to alter the series  to account  for those
changes,  we focus on the categories  of most interest,  STI and  DI, which  typically  are
affected  less  by such events. As the table shows,  we fail to reject nonstationarity  among
these flows  in only  two of the possible  cases. Both of the failures  to reject occur for DI. 13
XThis might  be considered  to provide  weak  support  for  one  interpretation  of  conventional  wisdom,
namely,  that  inflows  (or  outflows)  in DI  are more  permanent  than  inflows  (or  outflows)  of STI.
-7 -Overall,  whether  for G7 countries  or non-G7  countries,  there are few differences  between
the series  in terms of their stationarity;  and, while  there are clearly  some  exceptions,  the
assumption  of stationarity  best characterizes  the flows  of both groups  of countries.  14
"The most  notable  exceptions  occur  in Japan,  which  accounts  for  one-third  of  the (G7  and  non-G7)
failures  to reject  non-stationarity.TABLE 1
TESTS  OF NON-STATIONAR1TY
G7 CouNTR1Es
STI  LTI  PI  DI
Canada  -7.51*  -6.33*  -6.83*  -8.63*
France  -5.02*  -3.05*  -2.55  -3.86*
Germany  -4.99*  -3.51*  -3.87*  -S.50*
Italy  -2.87*  -2.10  -3.07*  -5.95*
Japan  -4.01*  -1.52  -2.51  -1.57
United Kingdom  -7.11*  -4.94*  -5.17*  -3.71*
United States  -2.10  4.87*  -2.03  -1.98
Notes: This  table  reports  the augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test  statistics.  The  lag  length  for
the  test  of  each  series  is chosen  through  sequential  testing.  An  asterisk  denotes  a test






Greece  -6.21*  -1.51
Portugal  -5.84*  -2.96*
Asia
Indonesia  -3.83*  -1.20
Korea  -5.31*  -3.43*
Pakistan  -5.52*  2.84*
Latin America
Argentina  -5.97*  -5.52*
Brazil  -5.34*  -2.80*
Mexico  -5.73*  -4.18*
Notes:  See  Table 1.
-9-The persistence  of the various  flows  can also be examined  univariately  using simple
autoregressive  models. To do this, we estimate  for each  type of flow an autoregressive
model  with four lags; then, we examine  the response  implied  by the estimated
autoregressive  model  to a disturbance  in each  flow.' 5 Conventional  wisdom  would
suggest  that the cumulative  responses  would  differ  across  the flows and  that it would  be
greatest  for DI. Table  3 and Table  4 report the cumulative  one-year  response  to a one-
dollar  disturbance  for each flow. Table  3 reports  these responses  for each  of the four
flows  in the G7 countries. As the table shows,  there is no clear  pattern distinguishing  one
flow  from another  in the G7 countries. Table  4 shows  cumulative  effects  of the STI and
DI categories  in the non-G7  countries. In all of these countries,  changes  in DI seem  to
have a more lasting  effect  than do changes  in STI. Thus, the non-G7  countries  provide
some  univariate  support  for the conventional  wisdom.
The stationarity  tests and the autoregressions  both address  the issue of persistence
in a univariate  framework. In most cases,  the observed  differences  in persistence  among
the flows  are not striking. The only exception  is the finding  among  the non-G7  countries
that changes  in DI seem  to have a more lasting  effect  when modeled  as an AR process.
'5We  choose  a lag  length  of  four  (which  captures  any  seasonal  variation)  to  be consistent  with  CDW,  who
also  study  the  flows  using  a autoregressive  model.
- 10  -TABLE  3
CUMULATIVE  EFFECT  OF  A $1 DISTURBANCE  AFTER  ONE  YEAR
G7 COUNTRIES
STI  LTI  PI  DI
Canada  -0.05  -0.03  -0.37  -0.51
France  0.21  0.76  1.56  0.34
Germany  0.08  0.76  0.71  0.12
Italy  0.55  0.98  0.49  0.28
Japan  0.74  1.82  0.59  3.09
United Kingdom  -0.20  -0.36  -0.08  0.55
United States  0.98  0.51  0.73  0.97
Notes: This table reports  the predicted,  cumulative,  one-year  effect  of a one dollar
disturbance  to each  flow based  on an estimated  AR(4)  for each flow.
. 11 -TABLE 4
CUMULATIVE  EFFECT  OF A $1 DISTURBANCE




Greece  -0.20  1.93
Portugal  -0.14  1.21
Asia
Indonesia  1.01  1.37
Korea  0.00  1.07
Pakistan  -0.20  0.87
Latin America
Argentina  -0.49  1.09
Brazil  0.62  1.15
Mexico  0.29  0.97
Notes:  See Table 3.
- 12 -Other univariate measures expose few substantial differences among the flows.1 6 Are
these and earlier univariate results enough to establish the essential similarity  of the flows?
We argue that they are not.  Similar univariate patterns among series can mask substantive
differences between them.  This is a well-known empirical problem. Below, we briefly
discuss the general problem.  Then, we examine the role it plays in the behavior of capital
flows.
Consider an example in which one variable, y, influences its own future and that of
another variable, x, but not vice versa.  That is:
(1)  y.  -y  Yt-1  +  Ey,t
(2)  Xt =ox  y-I  +  ex.  t,
where t denotes the time period; Eys,  and EX,  t are independently distributed random
variables; and, By  and  x are constants. The variables y and x will have very similar
univariate properties in terms of persistence.  However, yt clearly has more impact on the
future than does xt.  The effect of an unexpected disturbance in yt would persist through
its effects both on its own future and on that of x.  In contrast, an unexpected disturbance
in xt would not affect the future.  One series has a lasting effect, while the other does not,
a fact not likely to be revealed in a univariate study.
To examine the possibility that these differences may exist among capital flows, we
first examine the flows in pairs. For each pair of variables, we test for Granger causality
between them.  Table 5 and Table 6 report all cases for which we can reject at the 5
'6CDW  present  several  related  tests  with  the  same  result. We  also  used  the  alternative  R 2 test  that  was
employed  by CDW. As one might  expect,  the results  are essentially  the same  since  the R 2 of a univariate
regression  depends  on  the  degree  of persistence.
- 13  -percent  level  the hypothesis  of no Granger  causality  from one flow  to another  using  four
lags.' 7 As shown  in Table 5, we find evidence  suggesting  that STI is Granger  caused  by at
least one other flow in all  the G7 countries  except  Canada. In contrast,  there is no
evidence  that DI is Granger  caused  by another  flow  in any country  except Japan  and  the
United  States; moreover,  in Japan,  the evidence  of Granger  causality  is countered  by the
findings  of Granger  causality  running  in the opposite  direction."' Table  6 provides  the test
statistics  for the non-G7  countries. (As before,  we examine  only STI and  DI for these
countries.) As the table shows,  we strongly  reject the hypothesis  of no Granger  causality
from DI to STI for Argentina  and for Portugal,  while  we reject  the reverse  only  for
Pakistan. Thus, among  both the G7 countries  and the non-G7  countries,  the results of
these Granger  causality  tests suggest  that STI follows  other flows,  while  DI does not.
We next  use a vector autoregression  (VAR)  to examine  the relationships  among  all
the flows within  a country. For each  G7 country,  we estimate  two separate  VARs
structured  to focus on the distinctions  between  STI and  DI. Each VAR  has four
equations,  one for each  type of flow, and four  lags of each. The equations  express  each
flow  in terms of its own  past values  and those  of the other flows. The two estimated
VARs  differ  only  in terms of their attribution  of contemporaneous  explanations:  one VAR
allows  STI to depend  contemporaneously  on the other flows,  while  the other allows  DI to
depend  contemporaneously  on the other flows. That is, the two VARs  differ  only  in terms
17The Akaike  information  criterion  is maximized  for  the  fourth  lag  in  more  cases  than  for  any  other  lag.
So,  for  consistency,  we  report  the  results  for  four  lags  for  each  country.  However,  the  results  found  using
the  optimal  (Akaike)  number  of  lags  do  not  differ  qualitatively.
lsAt  the 10  percent  confidence  level,  we  can  reject  the  hypotheses  of no Granger  causality  from  Japanese
DI to all other  Japanese  flows.
- 14 -TABLE 5
GRANGER  CAUSALITY  AMONG  FLOWS  IN EACH  COUNTRY
G7 COUNTRiES
Significance
Country  Direction  Level
Canada  none  n.a.
France  STI to LTI  0.00
PI  to LTI  0.07
DI  to STI  0.04
Germany  DI  to STI  0.05
to PI  0.01
Italy  LTI  to STI  0.04
Japan  LTI to STI  0.03
to DI  0.03
DI  to STI  0.01
to LTI  0.06
to PI  0.01
United  Kingdom  STI to PI  0.03
LTI to STI  0.01
to PI  0.02
PI  to LTI  0.03
United  States  PI  toDI  0.03
DI  to STI  0.02
Note: Reported  are  the  joint  significance,  when  less  than
0.10.
- 15  -TABLE  6





Greece  none  n.a.
Portugal  DI  to STI  0.00
Asia
Indonesia  none  n.a.
Korea  none  n.a.
Pakistan  STI to DI  0.05
Latin America
Argentina  DI to STI  0.00
Brazil  none  n.a.
Mexico  none  n.a.
Notes: See  Table  5.
- 16 -of their ordering. One puts STI last, while the other puts DI last.  In this way, we can
examine  how much of the explained variance in STI and in DI can be attributed to the
contemporaneous changes in the other flows.
Summary statistics from the two VARs are given in Table 7 for each G7 country.
Table 7
VAR Estimation of Capital Flows
Under Alternative Orderings of STI and DI
G7 Countries
STI  Last  DI  Last
Explained  by  Explained  by
R2 Contemporary  non-STI  Flows  R2 Contemporary
non-DI  Flows
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Canada  0.52  0.37  0.57  0.09
France  0.63  0.66  0.51  0.31
Germany  0.52  0.42  0.35  0.27
Italy  0.68  0.70  0.37  0.04
Japan  0.73  0.86  0.90  0.12
United Kingdom  0.53  0.62  0.41  0.19
United States  0.52  0.34  0.65  0.15
Notes:  This  table  reports  statistics  based  on  four-equation  VARs  formed  using  four  lags  of all
four  capital  flows  in each  equation.  Columns  1 and  2 report  statistics  from  the  VAR  in which
STI  is ordered  last: Columns  1 reports  the  R 2 from  the  equation  explaining  STI,  and Column  2
reports  the  percentage  of  the  variance  of the  residual  in that  equation  that  can  be explained  by its
contemporaneous  covariance  with  the  remaining  VAR  residuals.  Columns  3 and  4 report
comparable  statistics  from  the  VAR  in which  DI is ordered  last.
We do not examine comparable statistics for the non-G7 countries since the
exclusion of LTI and PI flows renders this test much the same as the bivariate tests
reported in Table 7.  The first two columns of Table 7 describe the VAR in which STI is
- 17  -last. Column  1 gives  the R2 of the VAR  equation  describing  STI. Column  2 gives  the
percent of the explained  variance  of STI  that can be attributed  to contemporaneous
changes  in the other flows. A comparison  of Column  2 and Column  4 illustrates  the
differences  between STI and DI most clearly. As shown  in Column  2, the explained
variance  of STI appears  to be largely  attributable  to contemporaneous  changes  in the other
flows;  while,  as shown  in Column  4, that of DI does not. 19 Contemporaneous  changes  in
the other flows  account  for half  to almost  three-quarters  of the explained  variance  of STI.
Such changes  in other flows  account  for only one-tenth  to one-third  of the explained
variance  of DI. These results  confirm  those of Table  5 and Table  6 --  among  the capital
flows,  DI seems  to influence  the others,  while  STI seems  to be influenced  by them.
In terms of Equations  I and 2, DI seems  to correspond  most closely  to the variable
y, while  STI seems  to correspond  more closely  to the variable  x. That is, the multivariate
results  suggest  that the univariate  similarities  mask  important  differences  among  the flows.
Alone,  the univariate  results  seem  to provide  some  support  for the notion that the
categories  of capital  flows  were substitutable  and  that their distinctions  were possibly
irrelevant. In light of the multivariate  results,  that support  loses ground. Instead,  the
evidence  reinforces  the conventional  wisdom  that the composition  of the flows  matters.
4.  Cross-Country  Evidence:  Is There a Tequila Hangover?
In this section, we focus on STI and DI, and we examine the cross-country
relationships between these flows. If the categories are irrelevant, disturbances in STI and
1 9We  find  similar  results  for  past  flows.  The  explained  variance  of  DI  can  be largely  attributed  to its own
past,  while  the explained  variance  of  STI  can  be attributed  to changes  in the  other  flows.
- 18  -in DI should  be transmitted  internationally  with equal ease. This would  imply
correspondingly  that the two series  should  be equally  sensitive  to changes  in their  values
abroad. On the other hand,  conventional  wisdom  that STI is "hot money,"  while  DI is not
suggests  that STI should  be more  responsive  to fluctuations  abroad  than should  DI.
We examine  the international  relationships  bilaterally.  We estimate  the sensitivity
of each flow  to fluctuations  in the same  flow of another  country. The "hot money"  notion
implies  that STI should  be more sensitive  than should  DI to activity  abroad. That is, we
should  find  Granger  causality  more often  from the foreign  STI  to the domestic  STI, and
the foreign  flows should  account  for more  of the explained  variance  of STI than of DI. In
contrast,  if the categories  are irrelevant,  the differences  in the findings  should  be small.
Table  8 and Table  9 present  the country  pairs for which  we could  reject at the 10 percent
level  the hypothesis  that there is no Granger  causality  from the foreign  flow  to the
domestic  flow. Column  1 of each table gives  the significance  level of the rejection,  and
Column  2 gives  the fraction  of the explained  variance  in the flow that is attributable  to
changes  in the foreign  flow. As shown  in Table  8, we find  evidence  of Granger  causality
from foreign  STI to domestic  STI in twelve  of the possible  cases -- a rejection  rate of
about 30 percent at the 10 percent confidence  level. For DI, we find  evidence  of Granger
causality  in only six cases,  which  is about 14 percent  of the total. The proportion  of the
explained  variance  attributable  to foreign  flows  also differs  markedly  between STI  and DI
for the G7 countries. For STI, the portion  attributable  to foreign  flows  ranges  from
- 19 -Table 8
Sensitivity of STI and DI to Corresponding Flows Abroad
G7 Countries
Percent
Home  Foreign  Significance  Attributable to
Country  Country  Level  Foreign Flows
(1)  (2)
STI
France  Germany  0.040  0.21
Germany  Canada  0.000  0.39
France  0.002  0.49
Japan  0.099  0.34
U.K.  0.063  0.47
Italy  Canada  0.059  0.26
France  0.021  0.38
Japan  U.S.A.  0.018  0.17
U.K.  Canada  0.023  0.20
U.S.A.  Canada  0.049  0.19
Germany  0.010  0.20
U.K.  0.033  0.14
DI
Canada  Japan  0.094  0.05
U.S.A.  0.090  0.15
France  Japan  0.006  0.13
Germany  Japan  0.020  0.14
Japan  Canada  0.047  0.09
U.S.A.  0.016  0.09
Notes: Column  (1) reports  the  joint significance,  when  less  than  0.10.:
- 20 -TABLE 9
Sensitivity of STI and DI to Corresponding Flows Abroad
Non-G7 Countries
Percent
Significance  Attributable to
Country;  Country;  Level  Foreign Flows
(1)  (2)
STI
Argentina  Brazil  0.030  0.39
Mexico  0.080  0.24
U.S.A.  0.040  0.23
Brazil  Argentina  0.030  0.42
Germany  0.005  0.46
Mexico  0.090  0.23
U.S.A.  0.080  0.31
Greece  France  0.020  0.29
Germany  0.030  0.39
Portugal  0.007  0.42
U.K.  0.030  0.31
Portugal  France  0.006  0.36
Germany  0.002  0.54
Italy  0.004  0.54
DI
Brazil  Argentina  0.090  0.42
Greece  Germany  0.020  0.41
Mexico  Argentina  0.030  0.21
Portugal  France  0.005  0.46
Notes:  See Table 8.
-21 -14 percent  to almost  one-half For DI, the range  is much  lower: 5 percent to 15 percent.
These  results  suggest  that, for the G7 countries,  STI appears  to be more sensitive  to
changes  in STI flows  elsewhere  than does  DI, as the "hot money"  characterization
predicts.
The non-G7  countries  are grouped  by region. The bilateral  estimates  are restricted
to within  region pairs and to the additional  influence  of the G3 countries  (Germany,  Japan,
and  the United  States)  within  those regions. As shown  in Table  9, at the 10 percent
significance  level  we find evidence  of Granger  causality  from foreign  STI to domestic  STI
in fourteen  cases,  which  is more  than half  of the possible  cases. For DI, we find such
evidence  in only  four cases,  about 15  percent of the total. As shown  in Column  2, the
portion  of the explained  variance  of STI that is attributable  to foreign  flows  ranges  from
23 percent  to 54 percent. For the few  DI pairs for which  we find evidence  of Granger
causality,  the range  is only  slightly  lower:  21 percent  to 41 percent. While  the difference
between  the two ranges  is small,  the strong  evidence  of Granger  causality  among  the STI
flows  leads  us to conclude  that STI is more sensitive  to foreign  flows  than is DI in these
countries  also.
The importance  of the sensitivity  of STI relative  to that of DI perhaps  can be
understood  best by considering  an example:  the response  to a sudden  outflow  of capital
from  Mexico. 20 As shown  in Table  9, we find evidence  of Granger  causality  from
Mexican  STI  to the STI of both of the other  Latin  American  countries  included  in our
sample,  Argentina  and Brazil. In contrast,  we find  no evidence  of Granger  causality  from
2OCalvo  and  Reinhart  (1995)  describe  the  extent  of  such  "contagion"  and "spillover"  effects  found  for  the
overall  flows  within  Latin  America.
.22-Mexican  DI to either country. This transmission  of a Mexican  disturbance  to the other
Latin  American  countries  is what is commonly  called  the "Tequila  Hangover." The
behavior  of STI and DI contrast starkly  in this regard. While  innovations  in STI appear  to
be transmitted  swiftly  from  Mexico  to the other  Latin  American  countries  we study,  DI
appears  to be unaffected  by the Tequila  Hangover.
5.  Conclusions
Recent dramatic  changes  in the magnitude  and direction  of international  capital
flows  have  been accompanied  by major shifts  in the composition  of those flows. The
importance  of those shifts  depends  on whether  the categories  do in fact represent
economically  meaningful  distinctions.  If the categories  differ  as conventional  wisdom
suggests  they  do, then  the increasing  role of DI in capital  flows  to many  developing
countries  may  offer some  reassurance  that the new round of capital  inflows  need  not
necessarily  end as abruptly  as did the last round. On the other hand,  if the categories  are
uninformative,  then  DI is  just as "hot" as any  other form  of capital  inflows. In that case,
the shifts  in composition  offer no indication  that those countries  are any less  susceptible  to
destabilizing  reversals  than they  have  ever been.
The results presented  here  show  that the composition  of international  capital  flows
indeed  may  matter. While  we confirm  earlier  findings  of similarities  among  the univariate
properties  of the flows,  we show  that those  univariate  findings  mask  some  important
underlying  differences  among  the flows. In finding  that STI appears  to respond  more
dramatically  to disturbances  in other capital  flows  and in other countries  than does DI, we
provide  support  for the conventional  wisdom  that STI is "hot money,"  and DI is not.
- 23 -Differences involving PI and LTI are less pronounced.  In part, this may reflect
inappropriate classifications of some international debt and equity transactions.
Nevertheless, these results imply that the capital flow categories we examine here provide
meaningful distinctions between movements of capital with different properties.  The
financial instruments represented by these different categories do not appear to be perfect
substitutes.  The existence of differences among the flows suggests that it may be useful to
maintain some level of disaggregation in the treatment of capital flows in further research.
For example, studies of the determinants of capital flows may benefit from maintaining the
distinctions the categories provide. 2'  Such research into the determinants of the various
flows should provide insight into the sources of the differences that we uncover here.
21Chuhan,  Claessens,  and  Momingi  (1993),  and  Fernandez-Arias  (1994)  provide  examples  of such
studies.  Many  other  studies  focus  exclusively  on  DI. Some  prominent  examples  include  Froot  (1993)  and
Eaton  and Tamura  (1994).  More  recently,  Frankel  and Rose  (1995)  provide  some  evidence  that the
composition  of capital  flows  helps  to explain  exchange  rate  crises  in emerging  markets.
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- 26 -APPENDiX  A
CATEGORIES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CAPITAL  FLOWS
IMF BOP  Yearbook
Flow Category  Line Numbers
Direct  Investment
Equity  capital reinvestment  of earnings,





Public  sector  bonds,  other  bonds,
equities
Inflows  54, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61
Outflows  53, 56, 59
Other Long-Term  Investment
Loans, bank deposits,  other  assets  and
liabilities
inflows  65-68, 72-76, 80-83
Outflows  62-64, 69-71,  77-79
Short-Term  Investment
Loans,  debt securities,  bank deposits,
other  assets and liabilities**
Inflows  86-88, 90-92,  95-97
Outflows  84, 85, 89, 90, 93, 94
*Excludes  Reserves
**Includes  resident  official  sector,  deposit  money  banks,  and other  sectors.
Source:  IMF, Balance  of Payments  Statistics  Yearbook
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